Growth and External Debt Under Risk of Debt Repudiation by Cohen, Daniel & Sachs, Jeffrey D.
NBER WOIKING PAPER SERIES
GROWTH AND EXTERNAL DEBT UNDER
RISK OF DEBT REPUDIATION
Daniel Cohen
Jeffrey Sachs
Working Paper No. 1703




Presented at the International Seminar on Macroeconomics, Chateau
de Ragny, France, dune 1985. The authors would like to thank Mr.
Atish Ghosh, who designed and implemented the numerical dynamic
programming alogrithm used in section 4 of the paper. The research
reported here is part of the NBER's research program in
International Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the
authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER Working Paper #1703
September 1985
Growth and External Debt Under
Risk of Debt Repudiation
ABSTRACT
We analyze the pattern of growth of a nation which borrows abroad and which
has the option of repudiating its foreign debt. We show that the equilibrium
strategy of competitive lenders is to make the growth of the foreign debt
contingent on the growth of the borrowing country. We give a closed-form
solution to a linear version of our model. The economy, in that case, follows a
two-stage pattern of growth. During the first stage, the debt grows more
rapidly than the economy. During the second stage, both the debt and the
economy grow at the same rate1 and more slowly than in the first stage. During
this second stage, the total interest falling due on the debt is never entirely
repaid; only an amount proportional to the difference of the rate of interest
and the rate of growth of the economy is repaid each period.
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When borrowers have an option to repudiate their debts, the interactions of
borrowers and lenders over time presents a strategic situation of enormous
complexity. Consider the case of a sovereign borrowing country, raising loans
from the world capital market. Following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), suppose
that repudiation of the debt results in financial autarky and a loss of
productive efficiency of the defaulting country. An indebted country must
balance these costs with the direct costs of debt repayment, in considering the
option of repudiation. In turn, credit rationing will emerge from the lenders'
decision to limit their exposure to a level low enough to render debt
repudiation an inferior option to the borrowing country.
It turns out that the lenders' strategy is not easy to compute. The simple
maxim is to lend freely to the point where the country is indifferent between
debt repayment and repudiation. But what point is that? One of the incentives
for debt repayment is the option to borrow again in the future. But the value
of that option depends on how much lenders will lend -in the future. That -in
turn will depend on the future lenders' assessment of the point of indifference
of the country between repayment and repudiation, which in turn will depend on
the capacity of the country to borrow in the still further distant future. Thus
we have a problem of infinite regress, and the method of dynamic programming is
needed to solve the lenders' problem.
In this paper, we examine a growth model -in which sufficiently many
linearities allow us to give a closed form solution to the lender's and
borrower's strategies. We also describe an algorithm and a suitable numerical
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technique to solve for borrower and lender behavior in more complex, non-linear
settings. In the analytical version of the model, the borrowing country goes
through two borrowing stages: (1) a stage with unconstrained borrowing and a
rising external-debt-to-GDP ratio, with the rate of GOP growth falling
progressively; and (2) a stage with a constant, low rate of GOP growth and
constrained (rationed) borrowing. During the second stage (which always occurs
after a finite time), the country never repays the full amount of interest
falling due but only the fraction which is necessary to make the debt grow at
the same rate as the GOP of the country.
Section 2 sets out the model. Section 3 analyzes the optimal lending
strategy when default is an available alternative to the borrower, and presents
analytical results in the linear version of the model. Section 4 briefly
discusses the use of numerical techniques for more general models. Finally,
section 5 examines the sensitivity of the equilibrium to alternative lending
strategies. A conclusion summarizes the paper. All technical derivations are
presented in four appendixes.
2. The Model
We study a discrete-time growth model of a small country which has access
to an international capital market. We assume that the consumption, investment
and borrowing decisions are made by a social planner maximizing an intertemporal
utility function. The numeraire (both national and international) is a good
which serves for both consumption and investment. The international rate of
interest is assumed to be a constant, r. In this paper we do not deal with
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the important distinction between traded and non-traded goods. This will enable
us to use GOP as a measure of the potential foreign-exchange revenues of the
country. In a more general framework, one should be careful to use the
production of traded goods as the measure of the revenues which enable the
country to repay its debt (see Cooper and Sachs (1984) and Oornbusch (1983)).
a. Technology and Capital Installation
The technology available to the country is described by a linear production
function with only one input, capital:
(1) = aK
is GOP at time t, and Kt installed capital. (In section 4, we briefly
examine the case of more general technologies.) Installed capital depreciates
at rate d, so that the net increment to installed capital is:
(2) Kt+i = + (1_d)Kt
where I is the flow of newly installed capital. If there were no installation
costs, a social planner able to borrow at a world interest rate r would choose
either to invest or disinvest at an infinite rate depending on whether r is
less than or greater than a - d. In what follows, we shall assume the inequality
(3) r<a—d
so that the planner would choose to invest at an infinite rate. in fact, we
shall also assume that installation of capital is costly. Following Abel and
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Hayashi, we let J, total investment expenditure, and I, the flow of new
installed capital, be related by the functional form
(4) = [1 +
The unit cost to install capital is therefore (1/2)(It/Kt). which increases
with the rate of capital accumulation. With this formulation, the planner will
always choose to invest at a finite rate.
b. The Wealth of the Country
We shall define the productive wealth W of the country as the discounted
value of current and future production net of the investment expenditure, using
the world interest rate as the discount factor:
(5) Wt = =t(14T)(t)(aKi_Ji)
It is easy to show (see Appendix 2, equations (A2.5) to (A2.1O)) that the wealth
so defined is maximized by selecting a fixed rate of capital accumulation
(6) x* = It/Kt
Capital stock growth is then given by;
(7)
From now on, we shall assume that the value of g* satisfies g* c r so that the
infinite sum in (5) is meaningful. We show in Appendix 2 (A2.9) that the value
x* maximizing W and satisfying (3) is
(8) x* = (r+d)[1 - Yt — (2/4)(a-d-r)/(r+d))
This value of x exists under the condition
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(9) $ > 2(a—d—r)/(r÷d)
(9) says that installation cost must be sufficiently large so as to make the
maximum rate of capital accumulation lower than the rate of interest. We
henceforth assume that (9) holds.
c. Optimizing Behavior of the Country
We shall assume that the country is governed by a social planner maximizing
a time—separable utility function of the form
(10) U =
The choice of logarithmic utility helps to preserve key linearities necessary
for a closed-form-solution.
When the constraint on foreign borrowing is not binding, the optimal
consumption path will satisfy
(11) C,÷1/C = (1+r)
From now on we shall assume
(12) $(1+r) -c I +
which guarantees that the planner discounts the future sufficiently to desire to
be a net borrower.
d. Foreign Borrowing
The international capital market is assumed to be competitive, and to
supply loans at a fixed interest rate r (though in a rationed quantity, yet to
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be determined). All loans are for one period, with Dt denoting the principal
repayments due at time t, and rD the interest payments due at time t. The
balance of payments equation is:
(13) = (1+r)O + + It'' + ($/2)(I÷/Kt)] —
In general, as described in Section 3, new borrowing will be limited by a
constraint of the form h(K1). The goal is to characterize the h(Kt÷i)
function, and to study optimal borrowing under that constraint.
d. The Threat of Repudiation
We shall assume that the planner has the option of repudiating the
country's external debt. If it does so, it suffers two penalties. First, the
country permanently loses its access to international capital markets so that it
is forced into financial autarky. Second, there is a direct penalty on
production following debt repudiation (due, for example, to a loss of efficiency
following increased difficulties in foreign trade) so that the productivity of
capital becomes a(1—A) for some Xe[O,1). GDP hence becomes
(14) = a(1—A)K
Given these constraints, a defaulting country can reach an autarkic
intertemporal utility level, which we name vD(Kt). Note that this utility level
is a function of the stock of capital in place when the decision to default is
taken. We show in Appendix 1, equation (A1.8), that V°(Kt) is of the form:
(15) VD(Kt) = log(Kt)/(1_$) + Constant
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The constant term is a decreasing function of A. We shall assume full
information of both creditors and debtors of the value of A, as well as of the
level of the capital stock. Given this absence of uncertainty, default will
never happen: the lenders will select a supply of credit such that the borrower
will never find it profitable to repudiate its debt. The main purpose of
Section 3 will be to find this loan supply and to derive its consequences for
the growth of the country.
3. Equilibrium with Repudiation
We now examine the consequences of a threat of debt repudiation on the
strategies available to the lenders, and on the rate of growth of the borrowing
economy. At each point of time, the country has built up both external debt and
productive capital. In order to decide whether to default or to repay the debt
coming due, the country has to compare the autarkic utility level V0(K), which
is a function of installed capital only, with the utility it can derive by
servicing the debt and at least postponing the decision to default. The
subtlety of the problem is that the country's decision depends in part on the
future credit lines it expects from the lenders, who must relate their l!nding
decisions to the country's present and future choices. Technically, the
solution must be obtained by backward recursion. Given the constraints on
lending that the country is expected to face in the future, present lenders must
keep their exposure to a level which keeps the country from defaulting an its
current debt.
Solving the problem in its full generality is a hard task and
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simpi-ifications are needed to find a closed form solution. An example is solved
in Eaton and Gersowitz by assuming a fixed cyclical pattern to the country's
output, and no capital accumulation. In our previous work (1984, 1985), a
three-period horizon allowed us to solve a model with uncertainty via backward
recursion. In the model here, the many linearities which we imposed on consumer
tastes and on production technology enable us to give a closed—form solution to
the problem in an infinite-horizon model with capital accumulation. Before we
solve our specific model, we first set the problem in its general form.
a. Finitely-Lived Economy
In order to show how backward recursion is used to find the optimal
decision rule of the lenders, we first assume that the horizon of the country
ends at some finite time 1.
Let us assume that the country has not defaulted before the last period and
that it has accumulated by then a capital stock Kr and an external debt D1 (with
debt D1, the country owes (i+r)D in the last period). During the last period,
the decision to repay or to default is straightforward since the country has
only to compare the costs and benefits of defaulting in one period. We define
(following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981))
(16) VT(KT.OT) = max{V(K1,D). V?(K1);
with
(17) V(KTIDT) = log[aK1 - (l÷r)D]
and
(18) V(KiiDr) = log[(1-A)aK1.]
where denotes the utility that the country can reach by repaying its debt at
h1(K.1.) <=> V(KTVDT) )
From (17) and (18), hT is simply:
(19) hT(KT) = XaKT/(1+r)
Thus, the country will repay DT if and only if DT h1(K1) = XaK1/(1+r).





(2) K1 = + (1—d)K11
(4) J1 = [1+(1/2)(I1_1/K1_1)]l1_1
(13) D1 = (1+r)01_1 + C11 + 1Tit1 + (/2)(IT_IKT_P] — QT_l
and
h1(K.1.)
V1(K11JD11) is the utility that the country can reach by repaying the debt,
when it faces a new supply of credit which is constrained py D.,. h1(K1).
Let us finally define:
(21) VT1(DT1IKT1) = max (Vl(KTltDTl)i v°(K,)}
time T, and the utility it can reach by defaulting at 1. VT
of and 4, and is thus the maximum utility achievable at time T.
that when repudiation andrepayment yield exactly the same utility
the country repays the debt. Let us call hT( ) the lending limit






(20) (logc1 + $VT(KTIDT)I
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with Vl(KT_l) the utility level that the country can reach by defaulting on the
debt VT_I is the best outcome that the country can reach at time t given its
ability to repudiate the debt. We now define h11( ) as the rule which will
keep the country from defaulting at time 1-1. We want:
(22) 01_i hTl(KT1) <> VT1(KTlIOTi) V1(K1) H
By backward recursion, we can clearly define a sequence of lending rules
{h1( ).hTi( ),...,h0( )} such that (22) holds for all t 1, and v, vD, and Vt
defined analogously to the expressions in (20) and (21). Equation (22), when
generalized for all t, is the condition for the country to repay its debt
0 falling due at time t when it expects at time t,. .. ,T, the lending rules
ht hT to apply.
It is interesting to consider the case when X = 1, i.e. when all output is
lost in the event of default. In this case, a default at time t results in C
= 0 for all i 0. Thus, A = 1 is tantamount to assuming that the country has
no option to repudiate. It is easy to see that the planner will always choose
to service the debt as long as it is feasible to pay (1+r)O out of net exports
at time t plus new borrowing. At 1-1, therefore, lenders limit loans D.. such
that (1+r)D1 aKT (clearly, for (l+r)D > aK, repayment in period I is not
feasible, as there is no lending in T + 1). At T—2, lenders require that
(l+r)O11 C max(aKT_l_JT_l#0T)P such that 0T aKT/(1+r). Thus, (l+r)011
max[aK11Ji1+aK1/(i+r)]. In other words, (i+r)D1_1 will be kept less than or
equal to the maximum productive wealth at time 1-1; By induction, it is easy to
prove this result for all t C T:
—U—
(23) (1+r)D 4 max T=t(aKi_Ji)(1+r)it)
subject to (2), (4)
or, using earlier notation:
(24) (1+r)D 4 max
To sum up, when A = 1, borrowing is limited only by the maximum productive
wealth of the economy.
b. A Digression on the Precommitment of Capital Installation
In the maximization problem which we set in (20), we implicitly assumed
that the investment and borrowing decisions are made simultaneously, since the
lenders at time t can condition their loans on the investment decision of the
country. The loan at time t, is therefore made a function of the capital
stock that will be in place at time t+1. If the lending decision must be made
before is observed, there is a moral hazard problem. The country, even if it
wishes to precommit itself to investing a certain amount I in light of the
borrowing constraint Dt+j ht+i(K+i). may find it profitable not to do so
after after the loan has been granted. In such situations, the lending strategy
by the banks should be written
Dt 4 ht(Kti)
and the borrower will typically reach a lower level of utility because of this
lagged relationship. In all that follows, we shall ignore this problem by
assuming that the loan can be predicated on the investment decision each period.
We refer the reader to our previous work (1984) for further discussion.
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c. Infinite-Horizon Economies
When one lets the time horizon of the economy go to infinity, the
definition of the lending rule remains the same except that the time subscript
may be dropped, since h(Kt) will be the same for all t. An equilibrium will be
defined by the four functions vD(Kt), VR(Kt,Dt), V(Kt,Dt) and h(Kt). such that:
(25) VR(Dt,Kt;h(
= max [logCt + $V(D+iKt+j;h( ))]
t' t' t+1
subject to (2), (4), (13) and 4 h(Kti)
V(DtiKt) = max{VR( v )}
4 h(K1) <> VR(Kt,Dt;h( )) V0(K)
h( ) is therefore a stationary rule such that if future lenders are to apply it
as a criterion for future lending, it will also be used as a criterion for
current lending.
Before proceeding to the specific solution for V0. yR. and h in the case
of A < 1, it is useful to make one small amendment to (25). Though equals
log C, + and V1 = max (V11V÷1), the lending constraint
h(Kt+i) guarantees that V1 as long as the debt is repaid at time t. In
other words, as long as the debt is repaid once, borrowing constraints will
guarantee that all future debts will also be repaid (this is true only in a
model without uncertainty). Therefore, yR in (25) will also satisfy:
(25')
vR(ot,Kt) = max[loC + $VR(Otl,Ktl)]
where replaces V on the right hand side.
One case of (25) is easily solved: for A = 1. As noted earlier,
(1+r)0± will always be repaid as long as repayment is feasible out of net
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exports aKt - and new borrowing Dt+i. i.e. as long as (1+r)D max
(aK_J+D+1). Of course, is limited by Dt÷i ( h(Kt+i). Thus, the
borrowing constraint is defined by a stationary h function, such that h(K) =
[max(axt_Jt+Dt+i)J/(1+r), with h(K41). Upon substitution, for Dt+i w
have h(Kt) = max[aKt_Jt+h(Kt+i)]/(1+r). The solution to this functional
equation is:
(26) h(K) = max(y7_t(1+r)_(1_t)(aK._J4]/(1+r) = max W/(1+r)
Thus, as in the case of finite 1, the borrowing constraint when A = 1 is simply
that D(1+r) must be less than or equal to the maximum value of national
productive wealth.
For A =1, the problem in (24) reduces to the standard borrowing problem
without repudiation risk:
(27) max rt log C
subject to (2), (4), (13), and for all t,
D(l+r) maxy_t(aKi_Ji)(1+r)_(1_t)
and = 0, K0 given.
It is a standard exercise to how under these circumstances that the
optimal production decision and the consumption choice can be separated. Given
the international rate of interest, investment is chosen to maximize the
productive wealth of the country. Given the path of productive wealth, the
planner theli selects an optimal pattern of consumption, subject only to the
constraint that max W is satisfied. We show in Appendix 3 that the
equilibrium will be characterized by the two following conditions:
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Proposition 1: When A= I (i.e. the country can
never profitably
repudiate its debt)
1) GOP grows at the fixed rate 9* (equation (8)) which maximizes
productive wealth
2) Consumption grows at a rate 0 = (1+r) — 1.
The initial value of consumption is defined
so that the discounted value of
the infinite sequence of consumption is equal to the wealth of the country.
Under the assumption (12), consumption over GOP tends to zero in the
stationary state. This says that in the long run all GOP goes to repayment of
the debt. When the country has the option to
repudiate its debt, even at a
substantial loss, a path in which consumption
asymptotically approaches zero as
a fraction of GOP can never be an equilibrium, since the
option to repudiate
would eventually be exercised. Lenders will
restrain their lending so that in
the limit only a fraction of GOP goes to the repayment of the debt, and so that
consumption does not tend to zero in the long run.
One additional feature of the equilibrium is the following. The productive
wealth of the economy W is maximized by the investment path, and it grows at
the same rate as GDP, i.e. at the rate g*. Since g* C r (by our earlier
assumptions on the technology parameters), and since (1+r)O W by the lending
rule, we see that O must grow less rapidly than rate r in the long run.




(28) urn 0tt(l)t = 0
Let us define RPt as the net repayment of debt each period, given by the
difference of (1+r)D and new borrowing
(29) RPt = (I+r)O —
Since (29) implies = (1÷r)t00 - Zo(1+r)(t_)RP1,
we have Ot+i/(1+r)t = (1+r)D0 - 0(1+r)1RP.. Then,: taking limits and
applying the transversality condition, we have:
(30) (1+r)D0 = 17..0(1+r)RPi
In effect, the transversality condition is a zero—profit condition for the
sequence of loans: it guarantees that the discounted alue of repayments equals
the outstanding debt payment due at time t, (1+r)D.
We have found the transversality condition to.be implied by the market
equilibrium. If lenders expect (1+r)D+1 W for all I > 0, they will impose
(1+r)O÷1 ( in period t. In some models, the transversality
condition need not be an implication of market equilibrium (see Cohen and Sachs
(1985) as an example). Later in this paper, -in Sectiob 4, we will need to
impose the zero-profit condition (30) directly, rather: than finding it as an
implication of the model.
d. Market Equilibrium with Repudiation Risk
We now turn to the case of A < 1, and show that the lending rule h(Kt) is
linear in Kt. The equilibrium path, when A < 1 is described by the following
proposition:
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Proposition 2: Lending in each period is governed by a linear credit
constraint:
(31) h*K
where h* is a constant which depends both on the technology of production
and on the taste parameters of the intertemporal utility function. Given
this constraint, a country with no initial debt selects a path with two
stages:
Stage 1: The constraint (31) on the debt is not binding. The rate of
growth of the economy is high initially, and declines progressively, and
the debt—to-GDP and debt—to-capital ratios increase.
Stage 2: The constraint on the debt is binding, the economy and the debt
grow at a same rate n, which is lower than the growth rates in Stage I
and below the rate of growth, g*, which maximizes productive wealth.
According to Proposition 2, the threat of repudiation forces the economy
into an equilibrium with productive inefficiency, since the rate of growth in
stage 2 is below the level g* which maximizes productive wealth. With debt
growing at rate n1 we have = (1+n)Dt. Also, (1+r)D - RPt. where
RPt is the amount of repayment at time t. Thus, RPt = (r—n)D. or:
(32) RPt = with e = (r-n)h*/a
One sees that the repayment is always less than the amount of interest falling
due, rD. so that the lenders always refinance some interest payments. Despite
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this property, the discounted value of debt repaymentsequals (1+r)O, i.e., the
zero profit condition in (3) holds. (We know this to be true, since with debt
growing at rate n < r, the transvérsality condition in (28) is satisfied.)
Once the binding debt-to-capital ratio, h*, has been reached, the only way
the lenderscan keep the country from defaulting is tocontinue to lend
according to the sane rule. If they cease to do so, and demand, for
example, the repayment of all interest falling due, then the country will
default. (Proof: The rule 0* ( h*K, when it is binding, leads by construction
to = yR. Any tighter lending rule will then have V0 > R, and the country
will default.)
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix 3. Here we sketch the main
steps of the proof. First, we guess a function for hOC) and solve the optimal
borrowing problem under the constraint h(K), assuming no debt repudiation.
The optimal borrowing problem yields an optimal consumption plan, denoted
where the superscript R stresses the dependence of the optimal plan on the
assumed borrowing constraint. We then define the value of the optimal program
(under Fi) as v'(KtDt) = rsa t1log (C11). By construction, vh satisfies
the equation (25'): Vh(Kt,Dt) = max log(C) + Vh(Kt+l,Ot+l) such that
' Then, we prove for our choice h that ( h(Kt÷1) if and
only if vhl(Kt,ut) V(IC). Thus, we have found a solution to (25), with
yR = vi', h = h, and V0 = V0. Using we then prove the part of the
proposition concerning the two-stage growth path.
Specifically, we prove that the linear credit rule in (31) satisfies the
market equilibrium in (25). The properties of the borrowing equilibrium under
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Dt
h*Kt are easy to calculate, a shown in Appendix 3. We solve the optimal
control problem for foreign borrowing subject to the constraint that O. h*Kt.
The result is the two—stage growth process described in Proposition 2. Starting
U0 = 0, there is an initial period of rapid but declining growth, with D/K
rising to h*. Once the constraint is binding, 0/K remains equal to h*, and
growth remains equal to xh*, where xM is the root of equation (A3.8) in
Appendix 3. This growth rate is less than g*, the grovth rate that maximizes
(Remember that g is achieved when A = 1, i.e. when there is no viable
threat of repudiation.)
In Appendix 3, we present the non-linear equation (A3.12) that defines h*.
It is straightforward to show that h* is: increasing in a, , and A; and is
decreasing in r. In words, the sustainable debt per unit of capital rises with
capital productivity, the discount factor, and the penalty for default, while it
falls with the world interest rate. By a simple transformation, the maximum
debt-GNP ratio is a similar function of these variables, since D/GNP = O/(aK-rD),
whidh must be less than or equal to h/(a-rh) when U ( HK. In Table 1, we
calculate the maximum debt—GNP ratios for alternative values of a, , A, and r.
It is also instructive to compare the equilibrium growth paths for GOP
under alternative borrowing assumptions, as is done in Figure 1. The dashed
line, which increases most rapidly, is for GOP in the absence of repudiation
risk (i.e. for A = 1); the solid line, which shows intermediate growth, is for
GOP with repudiation risk (specifically, A = 0.4), with 0/iC initially below h*;
the dotted line, with the slowest growth, represents the case without foreign
borrowing (either a closed economy, or open economy with A = 0). There are two
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Table 1. Maximum Debt—GNP Ratiosa Various
Parameter Values
I. Alternative values of capital productivity, a, and subjective discount
rate, $ (for r = 0.1, A = 0.4).
a\$ 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.15 2.31 2.48 2.82 3.75
0.20 2.44 2.68 3.15 4.55
0.25 2.61 2.92 3.60 5.89
0.30 2.81 3.23 4.24 9.28
II. Alternative values of world interest rate, r, and default penalty rate,
A (for a = 0.2, $ = 0.9).
r\A 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.10 0.95 2.02 3.22 4.55
0.15 0.67 1.42 2.28 3.26
0.20 1.10 1.78 2.68
0.25 0.41 0.90 1.46 2.14
a
The other parameter values are d = 0.06, 4' = 10
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notable aspects of the figure. First, it is apparent that productive-wealth
is reduced by the option to repudiate. Second, we see the point of inflection
(in period 17) in the intermediate growth path, which according to Proposition 2
is reached when the constraint Dt h*Kt begins to bind.
4. Equilibrium with Repudiation in Nonlinear Models
We have been able to derive a closed—form solution for the growth path in
the case = aKt because the value function is separable in K and U (see
Appendix 3). This separability arises because two economies with the same
but different will differ only in scale. With U/4 = and
= 4, economy 2 will simply follow a path in which all variables
(C, D, K, GDP) are equal to times the values in economy I (Ct, IJ, 4, GDP).
Once the linear production technology is abandoned, an analytical solution
appears out of reach. Now, a rise in K is more than a scale change, since
output does not (by assumption) rise in the same proportion. For a standard
neoclassical production technology, Q = F(Kt), with Ft > 0, F'' C 0, a rise in
lowers the marginal product of capital and reduces the incentive to invest.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the maximum associated with Kt will not
rise in equiproportion with Kt. In other words, the h function giving Ut
h(K) will be less than unit elastic in Kt.
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In order to investigate this case, we resort to numerical dynamic
programing methods (designed by Mr. Atish Ghosh in conjunction with the
authors). Specifically, the value function V°(Kt) is calculated numerically for
a grid on Kt varying between 0 and 10.0, with steps of 0.1. Then, v(Kt,n) is
calculated using the backward recursion methodology outlined in Section 3. The
function is analyzed on a grid of 0 to 10.0 for Kt. and 0 to 2.0 for IJ., both
with step sizes of 0.1. Once and are calculated for a period of T—t,
as in section 3, the optimization in (20) is carried out by a numerical search
procedure over I and C, using step sizes of 0.05 for these variables. The
backward recursion procedure is repeated until and converge to
steady—state functions within the specified tolerance.
An example of this numerical exercise is shown in Figures 2 and 3. We
adopt a Cobb—Douglas production technology = 3K3. The other parameter
values are a = 0.27, r = 0.11, = 0.5, = 0.85, and = 0.3. Figure 2 plots
the maximum Debt/GOP ratio as a function of GOP. (Note that the jagged nature
of the curve results only from the discrete step—sizes tised in the programming
algorithm. These minor blips are unimportant quantitatively. A smoother curve
could be achieved by a finer grid size, but at the cost of much higher computing
time.)1 In the linear case, of course, this maximum ratio is a constant (h*/a),
independent of the level of GOP. In the case of Cobb—Douglas technology,
however, the maximum ratio declines as GDP increases. This is for a
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productivity of capital is very high and the investment incentives are
consequently strong. The returns to borrowing abroad are large, as are the
costs of debt repudiation (which would freeze out new borrowing to finance
further increases in K). As the capital stock deepens, the incremental returns
to investment fall, and the costs of debt repudiation as a fraction of GOP are
reduced pan passu. Thus, a capital—poor country will be allowed a wide
latitude in foreign borrowing, while a capital—abundant economy will be much
more restricted (as a proportion of GDP). The allowable debt rises as GOP rises
but less than proportionately.
As shown in Figures 3 and 4, this feature of the h( ) function has
important implications for the growth path and for foreign borrowing. As in the
linear model, growth and foreign borrowing start out high and then fall sharply
as the debt constraint is hit (in this case as of period 2). Figure 3 shows the
GDP growth rate and the current account deficit as a percentage of GOP.
Figure 4 shows the actual and maximum debt/GOP ratios for periods 1 through 15.
In each period, the maximum rate is calculated as h(Kt)/GDPt where Kt is the
level of Kt on the equilibrium growth path. In the first period, actual
Dt/GDPt < h(K)/GDP. In periods 2 thorugh 15, the debt constraint is binding
as shown. Note that the Debt/GOP ratio jumps sharply between periods 1 and 2,
and then declines over, as the country becomes wealthier (i.e. as the capital
stock deepens). The decline reflects the already observed fact that















































































































































































5. Alternative Lendinn StrateQies
In this section we return to the linear version of the model in order to
examine lending and repayment strategies which differ from the market
equilibrium described above. In the first subsection, we assume that the
lenders and the borrower can act cooperatively to decide upon a path of future
debt, consumption and investment, subject only to the zero profit condition in
(3) and to the condition that the country keep its sovereign right to repudiate
the debt at any time and to suffer the penalty thereafter. (If the country can
also credibly promise never to repudiate, it reaches the equilibrium of
Proposition 1.) Is there any contractual scheme between the lenders and the
borrowers that can dominate the market equilibrium and still keep the country
from defaulting? The answer is no, as we show in the proof of Proposition 3.
In the second subsection, we analyze a repayment scheme which has been
suggested by some analysts. We have seen that when = h*Kt, in stage 2 of the
market equilibrium, the country repays every period a fixed fraction e of GOP,
as in (32). What if the lenders simply demand that RPt = eQ. rather than
sticking to the rule = h*Kt? It turns out that when the borrower expects to
face the rule RPt = rather than the rule = h*Kt, the incentives for
growth are changed, in a way that undermines this alternative lending rule.
a. Contractual Agreements Between the Lenders and the Borrower
In this subsection, we assume that the borrowing country and its lenders
can design a path of future debt, investment and consumption such that:
(i) the loan satisfies the zero—profit conditon (30); and (ii) the country
never finds it profitable to repudiate its debt. The path is set once and for
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all at t = 0. Surprisingly, such a contractual arrangement cannot dominate the
market equilibrium:
Proposition 3: The market equilibrium yields the optimal pattern of
growth that a country can reach, subject to the constraint that it never
prefers to default.
The proposition says, among other things, that there is no way to avoid the
slowdown of growth described in Proposition 2. This slowdown is an inherent
implication of the option of repudiation; there is no way that the country can
credibly promise to grow at 9* forever.
To prove Proposition 3, we first define the new utility function Q which
would be attained if the country can design in advance its path of consumption
and investment subject to (3) and the constraint that it never prefer to
default.
(33) Q[001K0] = max y10t log C—
subject to
(34) rt_5) log C V0(K5)
and subject to (2), (4), (13), (30).
transversality condition (16).
Note that (34) guarantees that the country will never choose to repudiate the
debt. A priori, Q does not coincide with the utility V achieved in the market
equilibrium. V was defined as the fixed point of problem (25). Q is defined
—24—
directly by an optimizing problem. They in fact are equal, as we show in
Appendix 4. the crux of the argument is to show that inequality (34) can be
written O., h*K, as -in the market equilibrium case.
b. Repayment of a Fixed Fraction of the Revenues Each Period
Let us assume that the country has already entered stage 2 of its pattern
of growth. Each period, it repays a fixed fraction of its revenues to the
lenders in order to equalize the growth of debt and the growth of GOP. These
repayments can be written RPt = ((r_n)h*/a]Q, with n = 21* - d, where
xM is the investment rate in Stage 2.
Now, let us assume that the lenders ask to be repaid some fraction é of -
GOP, instead of sticking to the original rule of lending 0 h*K. B may or may
not equal (r_n)h*/a. We prove the following:
Proposition 4: When a country has reached the stage 2 of its pattern of
growth, the lenders cannot get repayment of their loans by abandoning the
rule h*K and by asking instead to be repaid a fixed fraction of the
country's GDP each period. By doing so, they would either induce the
country to default, or they would get repayment of only a portion of the
outstanding debt (i.e. the zero profit condition in (3) would not hold).
The proposition stresses the importance to the creditors of stating
correctly the rule governing their lending. In the market equilibrium, the
lenders are ready to increase their exposure at the rate of GDP growth. By
doing so, they create an incentive for the country to grow. Any slight
-25-
modification of the rule which reduces this incentive to grow yields a
sub-optimal result. A repayment scheme as in Proposition 4 creates an incentive
that is adverse to growth, since debt repayments are made an increasing function
of the output of the economy.
To prove Proposition 4, assume that the country is asked to repay a fixed
fraction ö of its GDP. It will select an optimal rate of growth by
solving:
(35) = Max log[a(1-ë) - x(1 + +x/2)]/(1-$) +
+ log
K0/(1—p)
(see equation (A1.8) where aO is substituted for X)
Let Xe be the solution to (36). We can compute the value of this repayment
stream by noting that RP+. = §GDPt÷. = OaK+. = öa(1+xe_d)'K. Thus, the
discounted value of repayments, which we denote by P is given as:
(36) Pt = =1P1(1÷r)1 = [aKte(1.ir)]/[r+d_xe]
Now, suppose Ô is selected so that = (1fr)D7 i.e. so that the debt is
repaid in present value terms. Call the selected value 8. Since = h*Kt by
assumption, we must have = h*(1+r)K. Thus, from (36) we must have the
equality h* = ae/[r + d - xi]. From (35) we then see that:
(37) = log[a - h*(r+d_x) - x(1+$x/2)]J(1-$)
+ $[log(1+x-d)]/(1-$)2 + log Kt/(1_$)
Now, we prove that c V0. as asserted in Proposition 4. That is: we prove
—26-
that the country would default if required to pay B GDP, for e high enough to
yield = (1fl')Dt. By definition of xh* and h* (at which the country is at
autarky utility in the market equilibrium), we can use (37) to write
(38) V° = log[a - h*(r+d_2*) —
h* 2+ $[log(1+x -d)]/(1—$) + log KtI(1_$)
Note that the RHS of (38) is the same as the RHS of (37) but with
replacing
h* 0
x. But x maximizes the RHS of (37) for given h*, so it must be V > V. If
the creditors are to be repaid, the borrower is driven below the autarky level.
6. Conclusion
We have constructed a model with endogenous growth and endogenous credit
ceilings. We have shown that the equilibrium path for the country is one with
initially rapid growth followed by a permanent slowdown. The equilibrium
strategy of the lenders makes the growth of debt contingent on the growth of the
borrowing country. In the linear version of our model, under the equilibrium
lending rule, the evolution of the debt follows two stages, a first stage in
which debt grows faster than the economy, and a second stage where both the
economy and the debt grow more slowly, and at the same rate. Along this path,
the interest due, rD, is never repaid in full; only an amount equal to the
difference between the interest due and g*D (the growth rate times the debt)
should be repaid. This permanent refinancing of part of the interest is the




Optimal Growth Under Autarky
The optimal growth problem under autarky is:
(A1.1) V(Ko) = max 70tlog(c)
such that
= K(1d) +
aK = + + (I2)UtIKt)]; given
To solve this problem, we define c = C/K, x = Note that
Kt+i = Kt(lt)i so that K = K0fl(1-d+x.), and log K =
log K0 ÷ log(1-d+x.). Since c = Ct/Kt. log C = log Ct + log Kt•
Hence, fitlog(C) = ' log Ct + 7° t.1og K = tlog c + );$tlog +
After a bit of manipulation, 70 $t[rilog(1_d+x)] can be
rewritten as 0[pt+l/(1_)]lOg(1_d+x). Thus, the original problem (A1.1) can
be rewritten as:
(A1.2) VA(K0) = max 70 $t{log c + log K + [$/(1_$)]log(i_d÷x)}
such that
a = c + x1 + (41/2)xtJ
Note that we have solved out for Kt in the objective function, so we no longer
need to include Kt+i = Kt(1_d+xt) among the constraints. Now there are no
longer any real dynamic constraints in the problem, so that we need only to
maximize{log c + ($/(1—$)]log(1-di-x)J each period, subject to a =c. +
x(1+$x/2). This maximization leads to a fixed A and xA (i.e. optimal c and
x under autarky) for all t, with xA given by the largest root of
-28-
(A1.3) (1-$)(1+$x)(1-d+x) - a + $x(1+4ix/2) = 0.
is then given as:
(A1.4) = a — xA[l +
Note that since c' and are invariant to I(, we have from (A1.2) that
VA(xK0) - I(K0) = r $tlog(XK) - $log K0 = log X/(1—$). Thus,
(A1.5) VA(XK0) = V°(K0) + log X/(1-$)
By substitution of (A1.4) into (A1.2), we find the explicit
solution for
(A1.6) V(K0) = r $t{log[a — xA(l+$xA/2] + log K0 + [$/(1_$)]log(1_d+xA)}
= log[a - xA(l+$xA,z)I,(l_s) + log(1—d+i)/(1R)2 + log K0/(1-$)
The-solution for the default utility V0(K0) is the same as for VA(K0) except
that a(1—X) replaces a in the equation for the growth rate (A1.3). That is,
is the largest root of the equation
(Al.?) (1—)(1+$x)(1—d+x) — a(l—X) + x(l+4x/2) = C
Then, as in (Al.6), we may write:
(A1.8) VD(K0) = log[a(1-X) - x0(1+x0/2)]/(l-) + log(l-d+x0)/(l-)2
+ log K0/(1-)
It is easy to show that x0 c xtk, and V0(K0) <.VA(K3).
—29-
Appendix 2






where NW0 is consumer wealth. The solution to (Al) is
(A2.3) = C0$t(l+r)t
(A2.4) C0 = (1-fi)NW0
Productive wealth W0 is maximized by solving:
(A2.5) max W0 =
_o(1+r) tiak - It[l+(1/2)$(Xt/Kt)]}
subject to
(A2.6) Kt+l = Kt(1_d) + It
If one calls the Lagrange multiplier associated with (A6), one finds
(A2.7) x a I,/Kt = (q-1)7
and
(A2.8) q1(1+r) = q(l—d) + a +
The optimal path is obtained by selecting the unique value of q0 which
satisfies the transversality condition. Here, q0 is such that all will stay
constant, so that x is also a constant, x*, which solves
(A29) (1/2)x2 - x(r+d) + (a-d-r)/ = 0
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The solution, x, which we look for is the smaller root of (A9) (the other
solution can be ruled out by the second-order conditions of the optimization
problem). The solution is shown in equation (8) in the text. We let 1 + g*
+ x* — d. is now defined by
(A2.1D) Kt = K0(1÷g*)t
The productive wealth of the country is now defined by
= Ea -
Net wealth (subtracting foreign debt 0) is defined by NWt:
(A2.11) NWt = W — (1+r)O
At initial time, = 0, so that NW0 and W0 coincide.
The law of motion of the debt is given by
(A2.12) = (1+r)D + - [a — x*(1++x*/2)]Kt
Since C = (1—fl)NWt = (1-)[Wt - (1+r)D]. we have
(A2.13) = (1tr)D + (1—)[a —
— (1_$)(1fr)D — (a_x*(1+4x*/2)]K
Now, define dt = Dt1Kt. Note that = dt+i(Kt+i/Kt) = (1+g*)dt+i. Then,
by dividing both sides of (A13) by Kt we can write:
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(#2.14) dt+l = ($(1+r)/(1+g*)]d± + ((1+g) — 8(1+r)](a —
We begin with d0 = 0. The country becomes and remains a net debtor as long
as (1÷r) c (1+g*). This condition, which we assume, is more likely to hold
when: the world interest rate r is low; the future is heavily discounted (
small); investment is highly productive (a large); and the adjustment costs in
investment, •, are small.
By solving (A2.14), starting from d0 = 0, we find:
(#15) dt = fi — [$(i+r)/(1+g*))tf[a — x*(1+$x*/2)]/(r_g*)
Note that as t-., dt asymptotically approaches d = [a -




Borrowing Equilibrium with Risk of Debt Repudiation
a. Lenders' Strategies
Consider the following optimization problem:
(A.1) V1'(K01o0) = max siog C
such that
= D(1÷r) + C + IJ1. + — aK
K+i =K(1—d) +
with hK0 and D01K0 given
Define the following variables:
E I/K
Then, the problem in (A3.1) can be rewritten as;
(A3.2) = max
=otl09 c + Y t3log K
such that;
(i_d+x)dt+j = (1+r)rJ + c + + - a
= K(1_d+x)
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with d01K0 given, and d0 C h
Using the same method as in Appendix 1, (A3.2) may be rewritten again as:
(A3.3) vh(K0,00) = max g0tiog c + (log K0)/(1-$)
+ YX[pt+l/(1_$)]log(1_d+x)
such that;
(1_d+x)dt+i = (1+r)d + c + x[l + (/2)x] — a
dt+j c h
Note that we no longer need the equation of motion for K, since Mt is no longer
part of the objective function.
The optimal policy for in (A3.3) is clearly independent of K,.,, for a
given d0 (= D0/K0), since the objective function is additively separable in K0,
and the dynamic constraints do not depend on K0. Thus, Vh(AKQ,AD0) - v1'(K01D0)
= (log AK0)/(1-) - (log K0)/(1—fl = log A/(1-$).
Rearranging, we have
(A3.4) vh(xK0,Ao0) = Vh(K0,D0) + log A/(1-gS)
as asserted in Lemma 1.
Now, choose A = 1/K0, so that we find V1'(1,D0/K0) = vt'(K0100) -
(log K0)/(1-). Since we already know from Appendix 1 that VD(K0) = V0(1) +
we see that
(A3.5) V'(K0100) () VD(K0) if and only if vh(1,D0,K0) () V0(1)
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It is easy to show that V is strictly decreasing in its second argument
(more debt is strictly worse than less debt). Thus there is at most one value
h = ( h such that vh(l,h) = vD(l), and if such h exists, then
v'(1,o0/K0) () V0(1) as b0/K0 () h. From (A3.5), the same h is such that
v'(K0,D0) () V(K) as D0 () hK0.
Now, suppose we find an h* such that Vh*(l,h*) = V0(1). Then, Vh*(K0100)
> D h* 0
() V (K0) as D () h*K0. V , V , and h* then constitute an equilibrium
of the capital market, as defined by (24) in the text with =
We now derive the equilibrium h*.
Let us first derive vI*(l,h*). This is the solution to:
(A3.6) max $log c + r(t/(l_p)Jlog(l_a+x)
such that




We set up the Lagrangian for the problem as:
(A3.7) £ = 0t{10g c t ($/(1_$))log(1—d+x±) + tA{(1d+x)d
— (1÷r)d — c — x[1 + $x/23 ÷ a}$tut÷l[dt+j — h]}
Let us first derive Vh(l,h*). This is the solution to:
(A3.6) max =0fllog c + r(st+h/(lsnlog(1_d÷x)
such that
—35-
(1—d+xt)dt+i = (1+r)d + Ct + x[1 + — a
dt+i h
= h*
We set up the Lagrangian for the problem as:
(A3.7) £ = r t{10g c, + [/(1—)]log(1—d+x) + tA{.(1_d+x)d
- (1+r)d — — x[1 + + a}$tgt÷l[dt+l — h]1
(a) 1/ct = At CalL/act = 0)
(b) [/(1_)]/(1_d+xt) + Atdt 1 - At(1+$xt) = 0 (8L/ax = 0)
(c) (1_d+xt)Ati/ — A(1+r)M/ = 0 (af./ad = 0)
To these first-order conditions we add the budget constraint from (A3.6):
(d) (1—d+xt)dt+i = (1+r)d + c + + +xtJ2] — a
Solutions to (a) through (d) are given by Constant values of c, X, x, and ji,
with dt = h for all C Using (a), (b), and (d) we find the optimal
as the positive root to the following equation:
(A3.8) [(2—$)Jx2 + 2[(1-d)(1-fi)4' - (h—1)]x + 2[—$a + h(r+d) — (1-d)(1-)(h—1)]
Now, we rewrite the budget Constraint dt+i(1_d+xt) = (1+r)d + c +
xt[1 + ($/2)xt] - a to give c as a function of Since dt = dtl = h, we
have:
(A3.9) = (xh_r_d)h + a - xh[l +
Note that ch is piritten without a time subscript, now since consumption per unit
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capital is a constant along the optimal path. We now plug c and back into
the utility function in (A3.6) to get:
(A3.1O) vh(l,h) = r flth ÷ y0[t+l/(l_$)]lOg(l_d÷xh)
or'
(A3.11) V'(l,h) = log[(xhr_d)h + a - xh(l + xh/2)]/(j_ft) +
log(1_d+xh)
The last equation is found by substituting (A3.1O) into (A3.11). Note that
d[V'(1,h)]/dh = Vu/ah + (aVh/axh)axh/ah = aVh/ah. where the last inequality
follows from the envelope theorem (i.e. from the fact that with an optimal
choice of x, av"tax = 0). Thus, sign(dV'/dh) = sign(xh_r_d) c 0, so
h .that V (1,h) is strictly decreasing in h.
Now, it is easy to prove that there exists a unique h* such that
VI*(l,h*) = V0(j). First, V0(1,O) = VA(j), since h = 0 implies no borrowing
at all. But VA(l) > VD(l), so that v1'(l,h) > VD(l) for h = 0. Now, consider
w!ere d is the limit of D/Kt in the no—repudiation case of Appendix I
Since c equals zero in the limit in that case, Vd(l,d) = - c V(l). Thus,
since V0(1,0) > V°(i) > vd(l,a), and since vh(l,h) is strictly decreasing in h,
- h*
there must exist an h* between U and d, such that V (1,h*) = V (1). In
particular h* is the unique root of the equation:
(A3.12) log{(xh_r_d)h + a - xh[l + (t/2)xhj} +
log(ld+xh) = log tad-A) - x°[i + + [(1-)jlog(1-d+x0)
where is the positive root of (A3.B) and x0 is the positive root of (A1.7).
We can readily establish various properties of h*. By total
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differentiation of (43.12), we have:
(43.13) dh*/da = — 1(1—X))/[2(r+d—x')] > 0
dh/dA =
-a,/R2(x"--r—d)] > 0
dh*/d = 1og[(1_d+xh)/(ld+xd)]/[(l)22(r÷d_xh)] 0
dh*/dr = h2/[2(x1'-r-d)] C 0
where
= [a(1-X) — xd(l+A/2)]_l >
= ((xh_r_d)h + a - xh(l+xh/2))_l > 0
Finally, let us show that
(#3.14) h < 1 +
This inequality can be derived directly from equation (#3.8). Another way is
as follows. Equation (#3.8) can be derived from
(#3.15) Maximize vh(l,h)
(43.15) says that x1 maximizes the utility which is reached when the constraint
on the debt is binding. The first order condition (using the definition of
in equation (43.11)) yields:
(#3.16) (1+4x-h)(1+x—d)(1—) = $[h(x—r-d) + a — x(1+4x/2)]
The RHS is positive (it measures consumption per unit of capital). Therefore,




Now that we have characterized the lending strategy by Dt ( h*Kt, we can
describe explicitly the optimal pattern of growth. From equations (A3.7), we
can write
(A3.17) (1+$x1)(i+r) = (a + qx/2 + (1_d)(1+$x)][1_71] + dt(1+r)71
with = utI(Xt_i(1+xt_i_dfl
when the constraint Dt ( hKt is not binding, the shadow price T_1 is zero, so
that the dynamics of the system can simply be written
(A3.18) (1+$x_p(1+r) = (a + •x/2 + (1_d)(1+$x)]
Let us call I the time when the constraint on the debt is first binding (i.e.
the first period for which Dt = hxt). For t T-2, we have = 0, while for
t ) 1—1, > 0. After time T, the value of will be constantly held to Xh.
All that we need in order to find the entire sequence {x} is the value
x1_1 and
to define the sequence {xt}t<T_2 by backward application to equation (43.18).
At time T—1, equation (A3.17) can be written
(A3.19) (l+x12)(l÷r) = (a + 4x/2 + (i+$xh)(l_d)](l_TTi] + hy1 1(i+r)
(Note that we have substituted Xh = xT.) In order to find the equilibrium value
of XTI and TI_i, we need only to consider one more equation in and VT_i.
From the system (A3.7), we can derive:
(A3.20) (ch(l)'Il)]/r(1+r)) = h - [(1÷r)d1_1 + xT1(i+$xTI) — a]/[i+x_1_d]
Equation (A3.20) can be shown to be as H1_1 in diagram 1. It is an upward
sloping line for the values of x1_1 which are above h. When dt_i = h, equation
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(43.20) is a modified version of the current account equation when the constraint
on the debt is binding; the line would pass through (xh,yh), with Th the
stationary state value of when the constraint is binding. One can also check
that a lower value of dti yields a higher value of
The system (43.19), (43.20) defines the equilibrium value of (xT_IPYT1).
Here, we shall prove that (43.19) defines a downward sloping line as depicted by
rT_l in diagram 1. To see this, one need only to check that
(43.21) h(1+r) < (l_d)(l+$xh) + a + $x.
We already know that
(43.22) h < 1 +
so that we only need check that
(l+r)(l+$xh) < (l_d)(l+$xh) + a +
or, equivalently, that
(43.23) — (r+d)4xh + a — r — d 0
To see this, it is enough to write equation (43.17) when t = T+1. Both values
and XT+l are equal to the stationary state value h. Since h < 1 +
equation (43.17) can be rewritten to yield the inequality in (43.23).
We can now represent equation (43.19) as a downward sloping line such as
in diagram 1. Its intersection with HT_l defines the equilibrium value of
Since HT_l is below Hh (defined by dt_i = h), this shows that
is greater than
We can now depict, in diagram 2, the full dynamics of the system. First,
note that equation (43.18) shows that is lower than x*, the optimal rate of
-40-
capital accumulation (see diagram 3). Second, note that is below x* (from
equation (A3.19)), and equation (A3.21): (1+x._1)(1÷r) c a + +
< a ÷ + (1++x*)(i_h) = (1+x*)(1+r); SO that < x*.
XTI takes therefore some intermediate value between and x* and the dynamics
are as in the diagram.
—4
Appendix 4
Proof of Proposition 3
Let us prove that Q coincides with V in 5 steps.
Step I
First, we show:
(A4.1) Q(xc0,x}c0) = Q(001K0) + log A/(1-fl.
The argument is as in Appendix 3. If (C,Ij is an optimal solution to
Q(D0,K0), {xc1xIJ is an optimal solution to Q(AD01AK0).
Step 2
In the constraint (34), we can write (O5,K) in place of log c
The proof uses a standard argument of dynamic programming. If the RHS did not
coincide with U (which is the maximum one can reach at time s), then one could
increase Q(00,K0) by changing (C..,I}> to the solution {cI!>, which
maximizes Q(DiK5). Clearly this change would not violate inequality (34).
Thus, (33) can be rewritten as:





subject to Q[D,KJ V(K), and (2), (4), (13), (16) and (30).
Step 3
There exists an hQ such that Q(D01K0) V0(K} <=> 0 hK0. The argument
is as in Appendix 3 when (A4.1) is acknowledged.
—42--
Step 4
From Steps 2 and 3, Q(001K0) can be written = Max log C
subject to D hK.
Step 5
= h*
) h*, since 0 defines the optimum optimorum. But h* ) hQ. since h* defines
the largest 0/K ratio which keeps the country from defaulting.
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Footnote
1. With the grid selected, there are two thousand points in the domain of
V(Kt,Dt). An optimization must be performed at each of these points for
each period in which is evaluated. Even with the coarse grid that has. been
used, the evaluation of and requires substantial computer time.
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